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The Corporate Governance–Risk Taking Nexus: Evidence from 
Insurance Companies 
 
Abstract  
This study examines the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on 
insurance companies’ risk-taking in the UK context. The study uses a panel data of all listed 
insurance companies on FTSE 350 over the 2005-2014 period. The results show that the 
board size and board meetings are significantly and negatively related to risk-taking. In 
contrast, the results show that board independence and audit committee size are statistically 
insignificant, but negatively related to risk-taking. The findings are robust to alternative 
measures and endogeneities. Our findings have important implications for investors, 
managers, regulators of financial institutions and effectiveness of corporate governance 
reforms that have been pursued. 
Keywords: Agency Theory; Corporate Governance; Insurance Companies; Risk-Taking; 
UK. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of internal corporate governance mechanism on risk-
taking during the period 2005 to 2014 in UK insurance companies. Insurance companies’ 
activities are opaque and complex, since they depend on complex assumptions, including 
mortality rates, upcoming expenses, and interval and discontinuance percentages, in addition 
to impending investment yields (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Boubakri, 2011). As a result, 
insurance companies need strong governance, as well as effective accounting and financial 
reporting standards, to enable proper insights into the company’s financial position. However, 
the World Bank and IMF highlight corporate governance (CG) as a major defence in the 
insurance sector (Cheng et al., 2011; Eling & Marek, 2014). In addition, the EU introduced 
and approved Solvency II in 2009. Solvency II ensures that a firm’s governance and risk 
management method is acceptable (Boubakri, 2011). We focus on insurance companies 
because the ownership construction of different insurers offers an interesting setting in which 
to investigate the effect of CG on insurer’ risk-taking (Cheng et al., 2011; Maffei et al., 2014; 
Mayers & Smith, 2010). Insurance companies were not protected from the recent crisis, and 
the turmoil of the American Insurance Group (AIG) was blamed on weak CG, as well as 
extreme risk-taking. The financial crisis revealed weaknesses in executive compensation, 
board of directors’ responsibilities and the significance of risk management, leading to an 
enormous consideration of the different categories of current CG mechanisms that could 
reduce risk-taking (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Boubakri, 2011; Mokhtar & Mellett, 2013; Nahar, 
2004; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Calomiris & Carlson, 2016). 
Despite the fact that the insurance sector in the UK is smaller than the UK banking sector, 
the insurance sector is large with regard to the overall economy. The UK has about 600 
insurance firms, whose total investments were estimated to be around £1.9 trillion as at 
December 2014. This equates to 40% of the assets of UK banks and is equal to the total value 
of UK GDP. Furthermore, the insurance sector in the UK is one of the world leaders, since it 
is the third largest insurance market worldwide, and UK insurance firms also gain a third of 
their revenue from overseas (French, Vital & Minot, 2015; Adams & Jiang, 2016). Insurance 
firms also play a great role in stabilising the financial system of the economy. Although 
insurance firms were to some extent more successful in facing the financial crisis than several 
other sectors, strong governance and high standards of accounting and financial reporting are 
essential to enabling an open and robust financial system, which can assist and support the 
economy’s needs. By enhancing CG, insurers can safeguard their companies and individuals 
Page 2 of 25Humanomics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Hum
anom
ics
3 
 
from risks and increase the economy’s resilience (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Afrifa & 
Tauringana, 2015; Boubakri, 2011). Overall, these major roles performed by the insurance 
sector in the UK are accompanied by many governance reforms, and statutory modifications 
that challenge its business models (Elmagrhi et al., 2016, 2017), and these factors have 
motivated this study. 
Debatably, there have been substantial improvements to the UK CG Code nearly every 
year. The latest worldwide financial crisis places greater emphasis on the need for effective 
CG structures and systems towards ensuring a firm’s continued existence. Accordingly, the 
UK CG Codes of 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 (forthcoming) have clarified the role of 
the board of directors in adding value to the firm. The FRC (2012) indicated that an active 
board should work towards increasing and improving the firm’s values, behaviours and 
culture. The latest UK CG Code, launched in October 2016, is based on the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach (FRC, 2014). It aims to simplify effective, innovative and prudent 
management to achieve long-term growth for companies (FRC, 2014). Given the significance 
of CG, some may assume that the sound risk-taking of insurance companies is connected to 
sound CG. However, as a result of the complexity and opacity of such companies, this does 
not directly answer the question of which components of CG will increase (or shrink) risk-
taking. 
Thus, this study contributes to current research by analysing the effects of insurers’ 
corporate governance environment on their risk-taking behaviour in the UK context, 
especially after the introduction of Solvency II and CG reforms. A considerable quantity of 
literature has been published on CG and risk-taking, but empirical evidence for the insurance 
sector, especially in the UK context, remains limited. Therefore, this study will shed light on 
CG practices and their impact on UK insurance companies’ risk-taking. Specifically, the 
study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on the effect of board 
structures, such as audit committee, board independence and board size, on risk-taking. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 3 presents the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 reviews the literature on CG and risk-taking. Section 4 outlines the 
research design.  Section 5 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework 
CG in insurance companies differs from that of non-financial companies because of the 
complexity and size of insurers, as well as the wide range of stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, 
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customers, employees, regulators and tax authorities) (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Bhimani, 
2009). Additionally, it can be argued that financial authorities, the government, investors and 
academics tend to worry about a firm’s performance if directors become self-interested 
instead of creating value for shareholders (Pass, 2008). Agency theory expects that strong CG 
systems have a controlling role over directors’ behaviour, particularly if the board of directors 
is large, and if its members assign appropriate time for the companies that they are 
independent directors  of (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Boubakri, 2011; Fama & Jensen, 1985). 
Agency theory suggests that strong CG mechanisms offer regular controls that ensure 
dependable and true performance; and therefore, strong CG systems can increase value to 
agents by periodically confirming and appraising insurance companies’ management plans 
and strategies (Bhimani, 2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To decrease unprincipled 
managerial performance and diminish agency charges, agency theory suggests that a large 
board of directors, appropriate time for control, the presence of independent members and the 
existence of an audit committee can all enhance the monitoring and, consequently, 
performance of a firm and contribute to stockholder wealth (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Hardwick 
et al., 2011; Hines et al., 2015). Eisenhardt (1989) argues that managers have different 
interests and goals compared to shareholders with regard to profit maximization. Even if their 
goals are not different, managers and shareholders may have differing opportunistic 
behaviour. As a result, with the aim of protecting shareholders’ interests, it is necessary for an 
appropriate and a suitable CG structure to be recognised (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
The purpose of CG mechanisms, therefore, is to moderate agency problems and confirm 
that managers’ performance is in line with shareholders’ interests (e.g., Nahar et al., 2016; 
Rashid & Islam, 2014). The Cadbury Code in the UK recommends a set of significant 
methods for bringing the actions of managers into line with shareholders’ interests. These 
include, for example, improving the responsibility and transparency of companies. The active 
construction of CG codes for the UK was designed to support the involvement of non-
executive directors and encourage audit committees to embrace their responsibilities because 
of their outside knowledge and skills (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Similarly, agency theory 
argues that the board of directors has a monitoring function; it is able to provide active 
observation of executive directors and to launch strategies which will accordingly be capable 
of benefitting the shareholders. Therefore, a board is regarded as a key tool which can 
indicate the success of a firm. Hence, CG best practices are organised to safeguard the 
boards’ actions and tasks from any unregulated influence, and to consequently decrease 
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agency costs associated with these tasks by reducing information asymmetry (Spira & Page, 
2003). 
3. Empirical literature and hypotheses development 
Regardless of the large number of previous studies on various aspects of CG, evidence 
about the connection between CG and risk-taking is rare. In the next sections, this study will 
evaluate the previous empirical and theoretical literature regarding relationship between CG 
structures and risk-taking in order to clarify the gap in knowledge regarding this connection 
and develop a number of hypotheses. 
3.1 Board size and risk-taking 
Board size plays a major role in the relationship between CG and risk-taking (Adams & 
Jiang, 2016; Bozec & Dia, 2017). Adams and Jiang (2016) argue that having a stronger board 
of directors can have a moderating role on managerial behaviour if the board of directors is 
large, especially where they consist of highly qualified and knowledgeable members. 
Therefore, a strong board of directors can increase value to agents by periodically reviewing 
and appraising insurance companies’ management plans and strategies (Bhimani, 2009; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Laas & Siegel, 2013). However, some previous studies have 
argued that a large board may lead to delays in decision-making, as well as conflicts and 
time-wasting for the board (Fama & Jensen, 1985; Jensen, 2001). In particular, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) propose that the board of directors should accept responsibility for monitoring 
management choices and performance, as well as agency problems between managers and 
stockholders. Cadbury (2002) claims that the most effective board size is between six and 
eight members, not including the chairman. However, Pathan and Faff (2013) have a different 
viewpoint; they suggest that a large board may face many problems, including poor 
communication and co-ordination, and thus impact negatively on their ability to monitor 
managers.  
Previous empirical studies have examined the relationship between board size and risk 
taking, although they have in the main yielded mixed results. For example, Adams and Jiang 
(2016) explore the impact of board structure on insurance companies’ risk-taking by selecting 
92 insurance firms in the UK, and presenting 1,168 observations over 13 years from 1999–
2012. The study finds a positive relationship between board size and risk taking. The positive 
relationship implies that larger boards with qualified and knowledgeable members have an 
enhanced moderating effect on managerial behaviour and decisions. Conversely, in a study of 
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the performance of Bahraini insurance companies by Najjar (2012) over the 2005-2010 
period, they reported statistically insignificant relationship between board size and risk-
taking. Additionally, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) examined the relationship between 
board size and risk-taking based on yearly observations of 5,228 firms in the USA during the 
1999–2005 period. The regression results indicate that there is no significant negative 
relationship between board size and risk-taking. Consequently, based on the above 
discussion, the first hypothesis for this study is: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and risk-taking. 
3.2 Board meetings and risk-taking 
The number of board meetings can affect a board’s effectiveness (Vafeas, 1999), 
particularly when directors discuss the firms’ difficulties and improve procedures and plans 
for the forthcoming year during board meetings, in addition to making strategic decisions 
(Barros et al., 2013). Theoretically, the frequency of board meetings can signify the extent of 
a board’s accomplishments and the quality of its monitoring in detecting managers’ 
misbehaviour, for instance risk-taking (Vefeas, 1999; Conger et al., 1998). Thus, it may be 
expected that increasing the number of board meetings will give rise to greater managerial 
monitoring by offering board members more pportunities to discuss corporate strategy and 
risks, which may ultimately influence a firm’s performance positively (Vafeas 1999). On the 
other hand, increased board meeting frequency may not be necessarily useful to shareholders. 
Specifically, Vefeas (1999) argues that most board meetings are spent on routine tasks. For 
example, board meetings and management report presentations, which affect the extent and 
effectiveness of managerial monitoring are often costly to organise in terms of time, meetings 
fees, allowances and other expenses. Accordingly, Jensen (1993) recommends that the firm’s 
operating context should be considered when determining board meeting frequency. From 
this discussion, the second hypothesis of the study is: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between board meetings and risk-taking. 
3.3 Board independence and risk-taking 
Independent directors, with improved qualifications and competence, signals to 
stakeholders that firm’s risk-taking properly reflects management choices, and that this 
performance is a trustworthy source for making investment judgments (Clarke, 2007). In 
contrast, organisations which are weak in terms of independent directors are likely to raise 
investors’ doubts and result in more agency costs, and hence, reduce performance (Connelly 
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et al., 2011; Core, 2000; Tanda, 2015). Hence, agency theory highlights the importance of 
independent directors to mitigate the effects of various inconsistent interests (Adams & Jiang, 
2016; Li & Wearing, 2012; Solomon, 2010; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). More specifically, 
independent directors safeguard the interests of shareholders by employing CG principles 
(Bhagat & Jefferris, 2002). However, some scholars argue that boards consisting of a 
majority of independent directors may influence firms’ performance negatively (Baysinger & 
Hookisson, 1990; Weir & Laing, 2000). Weir and Laing (2000) argue that independent 
directors often have less knowledge about the company and have limited time to offer in 
terms of monitoring managers, as well as difficulties in understanding the firm’s 
complexities. Based on the above, the third hypothesis of this study is: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board independence and risk-taking. 
3.4 Audit committee size and risk-taking 
Previous literature suggests that the establishment of an audit committee in a specific 
company is an indication of increased board effectiveness and efficiency (Adams & Jiang, 
2016). Agency theory assumes that  strong audit committee with regular meetings of 
qualified and knowledgeable members ca  have a controlling role over directors’ behaviour 
(Jermias & Gani, 2014). This can increase value to agents by periodically evaluating and 
appraising insurance companies’ management plans and strategies (Adams & Jiang, 2016; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, agency theory suggests that an improved and strong 
audit committee can assist organisations to distinguish themselves from others through 
enhanced risk-taking behaviour (Connelly et al., 2011). Previous studies provide inconsistent 
results. For example, Jermias and Gani (2014) find a significant negative relationship 
between audit committee and risk-taking.  On the other hand, Adams and Jiang (2016) find 
no significant relationship between audit committee and risk-taking. Hsu and 
Petchsakulwong (2010) show a significant negative relationship between audit committee and 
risk-taking. Accordingly, the final hypothesis is: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between audit committee size and risk-taking. 
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4. Research design 
4.1 Sample and data considerations 
The sample is the FTSE 350 insurance firms registered on the LSE as at April 2016. The 
FTSE 350 registered insurance firms have been selected as a sampling population for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the UK insurance sector is the third biggest insurance sector in the 
world and the biggest in the whole of Europe (PWC, 2010). Secondly, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland faced a huge scandal during the financial crisis, which impaired its insurance 
subsidiary unit as result of weaknesses in CG (Adams & Jiang, 2016; Ho, Lai & Lee, 2013; 
Yeoh, 2010). Finally, this study uses all listed insurance companies. Table 1 presents the 
steps followed towards selecting the final sample of UK insurance companies.   
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4.2 Definition of variables and model specification 
This study examines the influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms 
(CG), including board size, board meetings, board independence and audit committee on 
insurance firms’ risk-taking (IRT) within the UK context. To achieve this aim, this study has 
collected data from two main sources. Firstly, all financial ratios and details regarding firm 
size were collected from the FAME database. Secondly, the corporate governance variables 
were collected from the companies’ annual reports, which were obtained from the 
companies’ websites. This study measures insurance firms’ risk-taking by calculating the Z-
score, which is the most frequently used ratio in prior studies (e.g., Boyd and Runkle, 1993; 
Fu et al., 2014; Gonzáleza et al., 2017; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Using return on assets and 
return on equity; the Z-score (RT1) is measured as follows: 
 =
 +
	



 
                                                                                                                                           (1) 
While the Z-score (RT2) is measured as follows: 
																									 =
	 +
	


	
 
                                                                                                                                                (2) 
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where ROA is the insurance firm return on assets, ROE is the insurance firm return On 
equity, 


	is the ratio of total equity to total assets, and  is the insurance firm return 
on assets standard deviation. The Z-score is positively related to insurance firm stability and 
inversely related to risk taking. An insurance firm becomes “insolvent when its asset value 
drops below its debt and the Z-score shows the number of standard deviations that a firm’s 
return has to fall below its expected value that can deplete equity and make the bank 
insolvent” (Fu et al., 2014, p68) 
To examine the influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms (CGMs), we 
gather data on risk-taking. For instance, risk-taking using ROA (RT1) and/or risk-taking using 
return on equity (RT2) are used as a proxy for risk taking. Internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (CGMs) variables include board size (ICBS), board of directors’ meetings 
(ICBM), board independence (ICNEDs), and audit committee size (ICACS). Control variables 
include insurance firm’s size (ICTA), and liquidity (ICL). Thus, to examine the influence of 
CG on IRT, this study uses OLS regression as follows: 
 
itiiiiiiit YEARSICLICTAICACSICNEDsICBMICBSRT εββββββα ++++++++= 0     (3)                  
  
Where RT is used as a proxy for risk-taking. ICBS refers to board size, ICBM refers to 
board of directors’ meetings, ICNEDs refers to board independence, ICACS refers to audit 
committee size, ICTA refers to insurance firm’s size, ICL refers to liquidity, YEARS refers to 
dummies variables for each year from 2005 to 2014, and Ɛ refers to random error. 
0α is the 
intercept, and
iβ are the vectors of coefficient estimates. Table 2 summarizes the definition of 
variables. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
5. Findings and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive, univariate and bivariate analyses 
Table 3 shows a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables for each separate year over a ten year period from 2005 to 2014, with 117 firm-year 
observations. Table 3 shows that the average Z-score of the UK insurance companies 
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decreased from 2008 onwards. For example, insurance company Z-score measured by return 
on assets (RT1) decreased from 1.08 percent in 2007 to an average of 0.82 percent in 2008. 
This implies that financial stability decreased and risk-taking increased during this period. 
Table 3 also reports the same pattern regarding insurance company risk-taking 
measured by return on equity (RT2). This result implies that the financial crisis that happened 
in 2007 affected the UK insurance sector. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
With regard to internal corporate governance mechanisms, Table 3 reports that for the 
size of the insurance companies’ board of directors, on average, the mean board size ranged 
from 11.33 to 12.58 members, which indicates that it was not affected by the 2007 crisis, 
apart from a slight increase in 2009. In addition, it can be noted that other internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as insurance company board meetings, insurance company 
board independence, and insurance company audit committee size follow the same pattern. 
For instance, the mean number of board meetings ranged from 8.00 to 9.55. Generally, the 
average number of board meetings was 8.50 over the ten years, with a slight increase to 9.55 
in 2007 due to the financial crisis. Similarly, the mean size of audit committee ranged from 
4.00 to 4.58 members; however, it can be noticed that the minimum mean during the ten 
years occurred in 2007. This could have been one of the reasons for the increase in risk-
taking during that year; the observable decrease in audit committee size may reflect the 
monitoring level of those companies. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analysis. The 
mean value of RT1 for the sample of UK insurers is 0.71. With respect to board size, the 
average board size was about 12 members (mean = 11.80), which is similar to a study carried 
out by Jermias and Gani (2014).Regarding board independence (ICNEDs), it can be seen that 
the mean value is 0.63 and ranges from 0.10 to 0.85 percent. These findings are consistent 
with Adams and Jiang (2016). 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The Pearson parametric correlation has been used to explore the trend and significance 
of relationships between each two variables. Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation matrix. 
Notably, all correlation coefficients are below 0.65. This indicates that no series 
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multicollinearity are exist (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Pallant, 2013). Table 5 shows that RT1 is 
correlated positively and significantly with ICBS and ICBM. It can also be noted from Table 
5 that there is a negative relationship between control variable ICL and RT. Table 5 also 
shows that the relationships between RT2 and independent variables ICBS, ICFM, ICNEDs 
and ICACS are correlated positively. 
5.2 Regression analyses 
OLS regression has been used to examine the impact of internal CG mechanisms 
including board size of directors, number of board meetings, board independence and audit 
committee size on risk-taking calculated by RT1 and RT2. The first hypothesis examines the 
relationship between board size and insurance company risk-taking. Table 6 shows that there 
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between insurance company board size 
(ICBS) and Z-score. In other words, the results indicate that there is a significant positive 
relationship between ICBS and the Z-score of UK insurance companies. This relationship 
suggests that bigger boards are associated with lower risk-taking than smaller boards. This is 
consistent with prior literature (e.g., Jermias & Gani, 2014; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). For 
instance, the findings of Jermias and Gani (2014) also found a negative relationship between 
board size and risk-taking. The relationship between board size and risk-taking is, moreover, 
consistent with the view that due to greater expertise, a bigger board size offers extra effort in 
monitoring management (Cheng, 2008) compared with a smaller board size. Hence, based on 
this evidence, the first hypothesis is accepted, which indicates that larger boards are more 
effective in constraining managerial risk-taking. 
The second hypothesis examines the relationship between the frequency of directors’ 
board meetings and insurance company risk-taking. Table 6 shows there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between insurance company board meetings (ICBM) and 
insurance company Z-score measured by ROA and ROE (t of 6.561, t of 4.876, respectively). 
This implies that board meetings are positively related to financial stability measured by Z-
score. In other words, the results show a significant negative relationship between ICBM and 
the risk-taking of UK insurance companies. This negative relationship suggests that an 
increased number of board meetings is associated with lower risk-taking than for boards that 
meet less frequently. This result is consistent with the findings of Priya and Nimalathasan 
(2013), who also found a negative relationship between board meetings and risk taking. By 
contrast, this result is inconsistent with the findings of Jermias and Gani (2014) and Hsu and 
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Petchsakulwong (2010), who document a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between board meetings and risk taking. Based on the evidence of this study, the second 
hypothesis is accepted, which indicates that increased number of board meetings is more 
effective.  
The third hypothesis examines the relationship between board independence and risk 
taking. Table 6 shows there is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between 
insurance company board independence (ICNEDs) and Z-score. Hence, based on this 
evidence, the third hypothesis is not supported. These results are consistent with previous 
literature from Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), Tornyeva and Wereko (2012), and Boyer and 
Stern (2012). For example, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) explored the association between 
board structure and the risk-taking of UK firms. Based on 250 firms in 1994, they found a 
positive but insignificant relationship between ICNEDs and risk taking.  
The fourth hypothesis examines the relationship between audit committee size 
(ICACS) and risk taking. Table 6 shows there is a negative relationship between the size of 
insurance companies’ audit committees (ICACS) and risk taking, however such relationship is 
not significant. Hence, based on this evidence, the fourth hypothesis is not accepted, which 
indicates that insurance company audit committee size (ICACS) not affect risk-taking. This 
result is also consistent with previous literature from Adams and Jiang (2016), Hardwick et 
al. (2011), Tornyeva and Wereko (2012), and Vefeas and Theodorou (1998). For example, 
Hardwick et al. (2011) explored the impact of CG on insurance companies’ efficiency 
performance in 744 UK insurance companies from 1994 to 2004 and found a positive though 
insignificant relationship between audit committee size and risk taking. Similarly, Adams and 
Jiang (2016) explored the impact of board structure on insurance companies’ performance in 
1168 UK companies over 13 years from 1999–2012 and also found a positive but 
insignificant relationship between audit committee and risk taking. Finally, regarding the 
control variables, Table 6 shows there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between insurance company size (ICTA) and Z-score. This result is inconsistent with prior 
research. For example, Jermias and Gani (2014) examined the impact of firm size on 
insurance companies’ risk-taking by collecting data from 1332 USA insurance companies 
over seven years from 1997 to 2004. They found a negative relationship between firm size 
and risk taking. Table 6 shows a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
insurance company liquidity (ICL) and risk taking. Thus, this indicates that an increase of 
liquidity value leads to a decrease of risk-taking for insurance companies.  
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5.3 Additional analyses 
We carried out a number of further analyses to confirm the robustness of our findings. 
First, to test for the existence of any possible endogeneity, which has been argued to be a 
widespread problem in CG studies (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010), this study uses fixed effect 
regression model. Therefore, the model to be assessed is identified as:                   
ititiiiiiiit ICLICTAICACSICNEDsICBMICBS εδββββββα ++++++++= 0 RT             (4)                
where, everything remains unaffected as identified in equations (1& 2) except that, we use 
δ to refer to fixed effect. The results for Models 1 and 2 are reported in Table 7. These 
results are mostly similar to those reported in Table 6, suggesting that our findings are robust 
to possible endogeneity problems that may arise from omitted factors. 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
This study further implemented the 2SLS (two-stage-least-squares random-effects 
within estimator) to fitting panel data model (Baltagi & Deng, 2015). The results for Models 
3 and 4 are reported in Table 7 are mostly similar to those reported in Table 6, suggesting that 
our results are robust to possible endogeneity problems. The minor increase in some 
coefficients’ value of CG variables in Models 3 and 4 of Table 7 compared with those of 
Tables 6 are in line with previous studies which indicate that instrumented variables of CG 
variables are likely to predict risk-taking more powerfully than their un-instrumented 
variables (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). This examination reinforces the need for CG reforms 
for financial firms, especially in the insurance industry. 
6. Conclusion  
This study examines the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on 
insurance companies’ risk-taking during the period 2005 to 2014 in the UK. The results show 
a negative and statistically significant relationship among insurance company board size, 
frequency of board meetings and insurance company risk taking. The result is consistent with 
those of prior literature (e.g., Jermias & Gani, 2014; Brick & Chidambaran, 2010; Boyer & 
Stern, 2012). This study has contributed to existing research by investigating the relationship 
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between corporate governance mechanisms and insurance companies’ risk-taking, which has 
rarely been addressed by previous studies. In addition, the research has been undertaken in 
the UK setting, where despite having one of the largest insurance markets in the world, but 
has rarely been examined by past researchers. Despite the contributions presented above, this 
research has potential limitations that should be taken into consideration. The first possible 
limitation is associated with the sample. This research depends only on insurance companies 
listed in the 350 FTSE index.  
Similarly, the results suggest that there is a negative relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms (i.e., insurance company board size, insurance company board 
meetings, insurance company board independence and audit committee size) and risk-taking. 
Thus, this study suggests that corporate governance mechanisms reduce risk-taking by 
reducing Z-score measured by ROA and ROE. This study offers new possibilities for future 
research in a number of ways. First, future research may study or compare insurance 
companies’ risk-taking in UK listed firms with those of other markets like the USA, Germany 
and China. In addition, it could be beneficial if future research were to take a sample from the 
European Union in order to determine what the factors that affect risk-taking are. Another 
avenue for future research would be to use other and broader measures for risk-taking. Also, 
examination of other corporate governance mechanisms is recommended (e.g., remuneration 
committee, risk committee and ownership concentration). Finally, despite the importance of 
secondary data, the utilisation of primary data, such as interviews may enrich future research. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample choice process 
Sample aspects on April 2016 No of firms No of obs 
Total firms in  FTSE 350  350 3500 
- Non-insurance firms in  FTSE 350  335 3350 
= Insurance firms in  FTSE 350  15 150 
- Exclude three insurance firms in  FTSE 350 (because no data 
available for most of the years under study)  
3 30 
Final sample 12 120 
Exclude three years of one insurance firm (because the company 
was established at the end of 2008  
 3 
Final number of observations  117 
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Table 2: Definition of variables 
Variables Abbrev Measurement  
Source of 
information  
Dependent variable: Insurance firms’ risk taking   
RT1 ZscoreROA 
is the risk taking using ROA; The firm-
level Z-score; a larger value means less 
overall firm risk and greater stability. 
Annual report 
RT2 ZscoreROE is the risk taking using ROE. Annual report 
Return on assets ICROA Percentage of net income to total assets  
FAME; Annual 
report  
Return on 
equity 
ICROE Percentage of net income to total equity  
FAME; Annual 
report 
Independent variables   
Board size ICBS Total number of directors on the board  
Annual report 
(CG section) 
Board meetings ICBM 
Total number of board of directors’ 
meetings  
Annual report 
(CG section) 
Board 
independence 
ICNEDs 
Percentage of non-executive directors to 
the total number of board of directors  
Annual report 
(CG section) 
Audit 
committee size 
ICACs 
Total number of audit committee 
members  
Annual report 
(CG section) 
Control variables   
Insurance 
company size 
ICTA Natural logarithm of total assets  
FAME-Osiris 
Liquidity ratio ICI 
Percentage of current assets to current 
liabilities  
FAME-Osiris 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for each year separately 
Variables 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
RT1 
Mean 0.83 0.87 1.08 0.82 0.65 0.72 0.45 0.64 0.55 0.53 
Std. Deviation 1.11 1.20 1.46 1.37 1.08 1.03 0.76 0.87 0.71 0.61 
Minimum 0.10 0.12 0.06 -0.16 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.19 0.06 
Maximum 3.61 3.92 4.12 4.00 3.67 3.01 2.29 2.54 2.14 1.82 
 
RT2 
Mean 1.40 1.35 1.21 0.24 0.90 1.07 0.72 1.05 1.17 1.05 
Std. Deviation 0.83 0.84 0.89 1.50 0.92 0.91 0.98 1.08 0.97 0.68 
Minimum 0.20 0.29 0.27 -2.88 0.14 0.02 -0.01 -1.23 -0.40 0.33 
Maximum 3.17 3.24 3.69 3.54 3.46 3.65 3.65 3.62 3.45 2.97 
ICBS 
Mean 11.45 11.36 11.55 11.33 11.75 12.08 12.58 12.42 11.92 11.50 
Std. Deviation 1.92 2.06 2.02 1.92 1.86 2.54 2.15 1.38 1.56 2.24 
Minimum 9.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 11.00 10.00 8.00 
Maximum 14.00 14.00 16.00 15.00 14.00 17.00 17.00 16.00 16.00 16.00 
ICBM 
Mean 9.00 8.27 9.55 8.58 8.42 8.92 9.00 8.42 8.00 8.58 
Std. Deviation 3.63 2.80 3.96 4.03 3.82 3.87 4.57 3.06 2.22 2.78 
Minimum 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Maximum 14.00 11.00 18.00 17.00 15.00 19.00 19.00 15.00 11.00 14.00 
ICNEDs% 
Mean 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.61 
Std. Deviation 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.18 
Minimum 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.10 
Maximum 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.77 
ICACS 
Mean 4.09 4.09 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.58 4.58 4.42 4.58 
Std. Deviation 0.83 0.83 1.00 1.06 1.14 1.51 1.24 1.38 1.44 1.38 
Minimum 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Maximum 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variables Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
RT1 0.71 0.21 1.02 -0.19 4.12
RT2 1.01 0.91 1.00 -2.88 3.69
ICBS 11.80 12.00 1.96 7.00 17.00
ICBM 8.67 9.00 3.43 4.00 19.00
ICNEDs (%) 0.63 0.63 0.11 0.10 0.85
ICACS 4.34 4.00 1.18 3.00 8.00
ICTA (000) 133541.41 35183.60 311761.57 593.00 3213260.00
ICL% 1.14 0.78 1.20 0.01 6.88
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Risk taking using ROA (RT1),  Risk taking using ROE 
(RT2),  insurance company return on assets (ICROA); insurance company return on equity (ICROE); 
insurance company board size (ICBS); insurance company board meetings (ICBM); insurance 
company board independence (ICNEDs); insurance company audit committee size (ICACS); 
insurance company size (ICTA); and insurance company liquidity (ICL). Full definitions of these 
variables are presented above in Table 2. 
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Table 5: Pearson correlation among all variables 
 RT1 RT2 ICBS ICBM ICNEDs ICACS ICTA ICL 
RT1  1        
        
RT2  0.65**  1       
  0.00        
ICBS  0.33**  0.06  1      
 0.00  0.55       
ICBM  0.38**  0.15  0.068 1     
 0.00  0.10  0.463      
ICNEDs  0.05  0.11 -0.074 0.098 1    
 0.58  0.25  0.425 0.294     
ICACS  0.21*  0.20*  0.081 0.090 0.272** 1   
 0.02  0.03  0.383 0.335 0.003    
ICTA  0.25**  0.13  0.197* 0.519** 0.021 0.132 1  
 0.01  0.16  0.034 0.000 0.819 0.158   
ICL -0.18* -0.21* -0.026 0.107 0.149 0.123 0.099 1 
 0.05  0.02  0.781 0.252 0.110 0.187 0.290  
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Risk taking using ROA (RT1); risk taking using ROE 
(RT2); insurance company board size (ICBS); insurance company board meetings (ICBM); 
insurance company board independence (ICNEDs); insurance company audit committee size 
(ICACS); insurance company size (ICTA); and insurance company liquidity (ICL). Full 
definitions of these variables are presented above in Table 2. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
*   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
  
Page 23 of 25 Humanomics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Hum
anom
ics
24 
 
 
Table 6: The impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on risk taking 
OLS regression 
Variables 
Dependent variable: RT1  Dependent variable: RT2 
t P>|t| VIF  t P>|t| VIF 
Panel A: Independent : Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
ICBS 3.927*** 0.000 1.057  1.701* .092 1.057 
ICBM 6.561*** 0.000 1.388  4.876*** .000 1.388 
ICNEDs 0.662 0.510 1.111  0.879 .381 1.111 
ICACS 0.092 0.927 1.108  1.760* .081 1.108 
Panel B: Control variables 
ICTA 4.216*** 0.000 1.439  7.285*** .000 1.439 
ICL -2.181** 0.031 1.041  -1.343 .182 1.041 
Constant 6.307*** 0.000 -  5.511*** .000 - 
D.Year Included    Included   
F value 10.770***    10.231***   
R
2 
0.372    0.360   
Adjusted R
2 
0.338    0.325   
Durbin-Watson 2.120    2.348   
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Risk taking using ROA (RT1),  risk taking using ROE 
(RT2),  insurance company board size (ICBS); insurance company board meetings (ICBM); 
insurance company board independence (ICNEDs); insurance company audit committee size 
(ICACS); insurance company size (ICTA); insurance company liquidity (ICL); and dummy 
variable for each year from 2005 to 2014 (D.Year). Full definitions of these variables are 
presented above in Table 2. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 7: The impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on risk taking 
 Fixed effects  2SLS 
Variables (1) RT1  (2) RT2  (3) RT1  (4) RT2 
   t P>|t|     t P>|t|     z P>|z|     z P>|z| 
Panel A: Independent : Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
ICBS 4.359*** 0.000  3.463*** 0.000  4.025*** 0.000  4.589*** 0.000 
ICBM 3.615*** 0.000  0.82 0.414  4.713*** 0.000  1.49 0.136 
ICNEDs 0.64 0.524  0.26 0.796  0.55 0.580  0.30 0.762 
ICACS 0.38 0.705  0.36 0.719  0.32 0.748  0.50 0.618 
Panel B: Control variables 
ICTA 11.39*** 0.000  11.99*** 0.000  10.32*** 0.000  11.74*** 0.000 
ICL -1.02 0.310  -0.87 0.386  -1.19 0.234  -0.99 0.322 
Constant 2.40** 0.019  2.04** 0.044  2.39** 0.017  2.17** 0.030 
Fixed 
effect 
Year 
  
Year 
  
Year 
  
Year 
 
clustering Firm   Firm   Firm   Firm  
F value 
(χ
2) 
23.24   25.42   115.37   145.76  
R
2
 0.5872***   0.6088***   0.5829***   0.6069***  
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Risk taking using ROA (RT1);  risk taking using ROE (RT2); 
insurance company board size (ICBS); insurance company board meetings (ICBM); insurance 
company board independence (ICNEDs); insurance company audit committee size (ICACS); 
insurance company size (ICTA); insurance company liquidity (ICL); and dummy variable for each 
year from 2005 to 2014 (D.Year). Full definitions of these variables are presented above in Table 2. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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